that hidden objective truth, Maimonides has recourse to God, the Knower of Secret Things.3 Similarly, Kant, in his Metaphysics of Morals, Doctrine of Virtue, I, 2, 1, 13, discusses the importance of the conscience in judging the morality of one's acts. The work of the conscience, according to him, is "like adjudicating a case before a court." However, since the conscience is itself part of the accused, it cannot fairly be thought of as the judge in this court. Thus, one must conceive of an external Other as the judge. "This other may be an actual person or . . . an ideal person." If an ideal person, it should best be conceived as "a Scrutinizer of Hearts" (ein Herzenstundiger), that is, God. God, or more precisely, the Idea of God, is the "just Judge."4
In these texts of Maimonides and Kant, God or the Idea of God is introduced as the omniscient Knower of Secrets, and thus the absolute Judge of one's true intentions. Both philosophers presume that there is an objective answer regarding the question of one's true intentions, even though this answer is dif ficult to ascertain.
Although a Maimonidean positivist in his legal theory, Rabbi Nissim ben Reuben of Girona (c. 1310-76) , known by the acronym Ran, believed, like Judah Halevi and Naḥmanides, that the law concerns itself with objective ontologi cal truth.5 He believed, that is, that there is always an objectively true or just verdict, although he also held that that verdict as such has no legal validity. What is legally binding is the ruling of the judges in accordance with their own fallible understanding, whether or not their ruling corresponds to ontologi cal truth. Thus, the question whether a particular food is kosher or not has a definite ontological answer, but that answer is irrelevant to the law; for what 3 Needless to say, God's testimony is valid only in the sphere of personal morality and not in the earthly courtroom. Thus, in his Commentary on the Mishnah, Sanhedrin 3:3 (Arabic text and Hebrew trans., Rabbi Joseph Qafih; Jerusalem: Mosad haRav Kook, 1968), p. 160, Maimonides rules that transgressors who had been disqualified to give testimony, e.g., dice players, usurers, pigeonflyers, or traffickers in sheviʿit, are considered qualified to give testi mony if they repent and "witnesses testify" that they had the opportunity to repeat their past transgressions "but did not do so because of repentance." Obviously, these witnesses, who, unlike God, have no knowledge of "secret things," cannot be certain that the transgressors have truly repented in their souls, but their testimony regarding their penitential behavior is sufficient for the earthly courtroom. 
